To study the policy options at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) when planning horizon is nite, we relax the assumption of perfectly model-consistent expectations in a particular way proposed in Woodford (2018). More specically, decision makers are assumed to be capable of explicit forward planning some nite distance into the future. Within planning horizon h, agents deduce the consequences of a nite sequence of possible actions, using known structure of the environment which includes any newly announced government's policies. Beyond the limited planning horizon, it is too costly to continue searching all possible branches of the decision tree, and therefore, agents evaluate the states at the end of planning horizon using a value function that has been learned from prior experiences, i.e., v(B) for households and v(P f /P ) for rms, which necessarily takes into account only a coarse description of the state.
Following Woodford (2018) , by log-linearization, for decision makers with planning horizon h ≥ 1, we have y Here, y h t and π h t are real expenditure by households with planning horizon h and the rate of price increase by rms with planning horizon h for a particular fundamental state at time t. Note that y t is measured as a log-deviation from the steady-state output level consistent with ination target π * , and π t is measured as a deviation from the target π * .r n t denotes the deviation from the steady state real return on safe assets, andî t denotes the current policy choice, which is also written in terms of a deviation from the steady state.
We assume that all agents have a correct awareness of the current fundamental stater n t and of the current policy choiceî t . E t+1 and π h−1 t+1 will depend onP t ; but in predictingP t , they assume that all price-setters will behave like them, so that the ination rate will be π t = π h t . For the case of h = 0, the aggregate demand IS curve and New Keynesian Phillips curve will depend on the policy regime, which will be discussed later in the analysis of specic alternative monetary and scal policies.
We consider the eects of alternative monetary and scal policies under the following scenario: prior to date t = 0, we suppose that the economy has for a long time been in a regime under which there are no nancial frictions (hence, natural rate of interest rate r n t = r * > 0), government purchases are constant and government's budget is balanced in each period, and the ination target π * has been consistently achieved (the ZLB is no obstacle to this). As a result, households and rms have learned the value functions that are appropriate to such a regime. At time t = 0, unexpected shock on fundamental occurs, creating a wedge ∆ > 0 between the return on safe assets (balances held at the central bank) and other assets.
Moe specically about the fundamentals {r n t }, it follows an exogenous process, i.e., a two-state Markov chain. The two states are r n t = r * > 0 in normal state and r n t = r < 0 in crisis state, implying that the nancial wedge equals ∆ = r * − r. We suppose that, at date t = 0, the economy enters the crisis state, and thus r n 0 = r after a long time in the steady state with r n t = r * and ination equal to π * . Once in the crisis state, there is a probability 0 < δ < 1 in each period of continuing to be in the crisis state again in the following period, and a probability 1 − δ of reverting to the normal state. For simplicity, Ination target π * = 0.005 this probability of exit is independent of the length of time already spent in the crisis state.
Once the economy returns to the normal state, it is expected to remain there forever, i.e., the nancial wedge becomes zero again and is expected to be zero thereafter. The variablê r n t in (A.1) is written in terms of deviations from the steady state value in the normal state, i.e.,r n t = 0 in the normal state whiler n t = r − r * ≡ −∆ < 0 in the crisis state.
Sinceî t is also written in terms of a deviation from the normal steady state in which the constant nominal interest is r * + π * , the zero-lower-bound constraint requires that ı t ≥ −(r * + π * ) (A.3) in all periods. Note that we assume r * > 0, π * > 0.
A.1 Calibration
In order to compare with the results under rational expectation equilibrium (REE), we calibrate the parameters to be the same as those in REE analysis, as in Woodford (2011) . The parameters are chosen to t the size of the contraction experienced by the US economy during the Great Depression. For a quarter model, we set the subject discount factor β = 0.997, the response of ination to output gap in Phillips curve κ = 0.00859, the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ = 0.862 (i.e., the relative risk aversion), and the scal multiplier in exible price Γ = 0.425. The shock required to account for the size of the contraction during the Great Depression is r = −0.010 and the probability of staying in crisis state is δ = 0.903. Note that the natural rate in the normal time steady state is given by r * = 1/β − 1. In addition, we adopt a 2% annual ination target, i.e., π * = 0.005. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1 .
B Monetary Policy: Ination Targeting
In this section, we study what should happen when the crisis occurs, if there is no change in either scal or monetary policy, and the monetary policy is specied by a strict ination target: ination rate π * is maintained as long as consistent with the ZLB. More specically, suppose that the central bank achieves its ination target π * whenever it is consistent with (A.3), and setsî t as lower as possible otherwise. Its policy rule therefore requires that π t ≤ 0 
Hence, π t = 0 in each period, regardless of the assumed distribution of planning horizons. Solution in the crisis state : conditions (A.1)-(A.2) for horizon h = 0 now reduce to y 
Note that if (B.4) does not hold, the innite sums Σ j ω j y j , Σ j ω j π j diverge. But this possibility is not of realistic interest, since surely there should be some nite upper bound beyond which ω j = 0; the assumption of an exponential distribution is an approximation for the sake of convenience in the algebraic calculation.
C Government Purchases with Ination Targeting
Since the monetary policy may be constrained by the ZLB during the crisis periods, in this section, we study real government purchases as a type of scal stimulus: government purchases are increased by a constant amount as along as crisis state persists, and return to normal level when the economy reverts back to normal state. More specically, we assume that government purchases G t follow a two-state Markov process, i.e., G t = 0 in the normal state and G t = G > 0 in the crisis state. Hence, the government purchases g t as a percentage of steady-state output in normal state is given by g t = 0 in the normal state and g t = G/Ȳ > 0 in the crisis state, whereȲ is the steady-state output level.
1
Suppose the fundamentals {r n t } follow the same exogenous process as in Section B, and the monetary policy is also the same as specied in Section B (i.e., ination targeting).
For simplicity, we assume a balanced-budget policy, i.e., no change in the time-path of real government debt b t .
Following Woodford (2011 Woodford ( , 2018 , by log-linearization, for decision makers with planning horizon h ≥ 1, we have 
1 At least in the case that G is not very large compared withȲ , the log-linear approximation is accurate. 2 Similar to the notation in Woodford (2018), the period utility of household i is dened as u(
where C i t is the quantity consumed in period t and H i t is hours of labor supplied in period t. As usual, u(·) is an increasing, strictly concave function, and w(·) is an increasing, convex function. Note thatw(Y ) = w(f
is the disutility to the household of supplying a quantity of output Y , and f is the production technology.
In order to achieve the ination target, it requires to have π RE = 0, which implies y RE = Γg. In this case, we have 
so that the ination target cannot be achieved even withî at its lower bound.
C.2 The Equilibrium with Finite Planning Horizon
For agents with any nite horizon h ≥ 0, the solution once the normal state is reached is the same with that of REE case, and thus no further discussion needed. Instead, we focus on the solution in the crisis state.
If all have horizon h = 0: then while still in the crisis state, (π 0 , y 0 ) are functions of g that satisfy
In order to achieve the ination target, it requires to have π 0 = 0 ⇒ y 0 = ΓĜ. In this case, we have 
For any nite horizon h ≥ 1: then while in the crisis state, (π h , y h ) are functions of g that satisfy
then the ination target is achieved, and is expected to be achieved over the rest of the planning horizon. Consequently, we have
• Proof: Proceed by induction. Suppose that we have already shown that π j = 0, y j = ΓĜ for all j ≤ h − 1. We wish to show that it is also true for j = h. Since π j−1 = 0, achievement of π h = 0 would require y h = ΓĜ. This would then require that
But this is consistent with the ZLB as long as g ≥ḡ
2. Ifḡ 0 ≤ g <ḡ RE : then the ZLB binds, and is expected to continue to bind for h periods, but is not expected to bind in the nal period of the nite-horizon planning exercise.
We have already shown that if h = 0, the ZLB does not bind in this case, i.e.,
Under the above conjecture, (π h , y h ) for any h ≥ 1 must satisfy
The system (C.6a)-(C.6b) can be solved recursively, starting from the initial values (C.5). It needs to shown that the solution to this system satises π h < 0 for all h ≥ 1, thus verifying that the ZLB binds.
• Proof: again proceed by induction. Suppose that we have already shown that
Since we have already established in (C.5) that (C.7) holds when j = 0, we get • Proof: proceed by induction. In fact, the proof for the case ofḡ 0 ≤ g <ḡ state is expected to be consistent. But with nite planning horizons, scal multipliers can be much smaller. When the government purchase is small (i.e., g <ḡ 0 ), Figure 3 shows the scal multiplier with respect to dierent planning horizons, and if the horizon h is short, the initial multiplier can be as low as 1. With a substantial increase in g, Figure 4 shows the scal multiplier with respect to dierent planning horizons, and if horizon h is short, the initial multiplier can be even less than 1.
In the numerical calibration, increasing g by even 1 percent of GDP is enough to make the scal multiplier fall to lower level. Actually, this depends on assuming a quarterly model used for forward planning if periods are shorter, the increase in g that causes the multiplier to fall is even smaller zero in the continuous-time limit. Therefore, the relevant multiplier is really the one associated with the intermediate region in 2, where output gap is eliminated for the case of h = 0, and as illustrated in Figure 4 .
D Lump-sum Transfer Financed by Government Debt with Ination Targeting
Allowing for shorter planning horizons increases the predicted eectiveness of scal stimulus programs in one respect: it provides a reason for decit-nanced government spending to be more stimulative. Ricardian equivalence will not hold with nite planning horizons, if we assume that people have not already learned to condition their value functions on the size of public debt. In this section, we consider a government lump-sum transfer nanced by government debt with ination targeting as specied in Section B. Consider a policy under which, when the crisis state is entered, the government makes a lump-sum transfer to households, nanced by issuing government debt. Thereafter, lumpsum taxes or transfers occur each period of whatever size is needed to maintain a constant level of real public debt. The policy is completely described by a single number, the new level of real public debt B * ≥ 0. We assume no change in government purchases to focus on a pure transfer policy.
The policy rule can be written as B t+1 = B * for all t ≥ 0 where t = 0 is the period in which the crisis state is entered. It implies that a structural equation for the level of lump-sum taxes collected each period is given by
Monetary policy is assumed to be the same as in Section B: the ination target is achieved whenever it is consistent with the ZLB; otherwise, the nominal interest rate is set as low as possible. We conjecture that this will mean that during the crisis period, the ZLB will bind, so that we will have i t = 0, P t ≤ P t−1Π for all t; and that during the normal period, the ination target will be achieved, so that P t /P t−1 =Π, i t ≥ 0 for all t. We will look for a solution in which the equations are satised, and then check that the inequalities are satised as well.
In the forward planning by a household with planning horizon h in any period t, it is assumed that all other households also have the same planning horizon h in period t, and a planning horizon h − j in any period t + j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ h. Hence, the household's plan assumes that, in each period t + j (0 ≤ j ≤ h), income y h−j t+j will be equal to the amount of spending c h−j t+j that it plans; it follows that the household's plan must involve terminal wealth B t+k equal to the aggregate supply of government debt at that time, namely, B * . It implies that the F.O.C. for the nal period of the plan will be
By log-linearization, this becomes
. Note that the quantity t measures the disturbances to the urgency of spending.
Given that t = 0 at all times in the case that we are analyzing, in the anticipated evolution of the economy, we must have 
If we conjecture a solution in which the ination target is achieved, regardless of the planning horizon h, thenπ h = 0 for all h ≥ 0, and then we must haveȳ h = 0 for all h ≥ 0 as well. It impliesî
which are consistent with the ZLB. Since the ZLB is satised, the conjecture that there is a solution of this form is conrmed.
Dynamics in the crisis state : (y 
Substituting the solutionπ h =ȳ h = 0 for all h ≥ 0, these equations reduce to
Consider now whether the ZLB binds for the case of horizon h = 0. Achieving π 0 = 0 would require y 0 = 0, and henceî = σ −1 y * − ∆. This is consistent withî
if and only if y * ≥ σ∆ > 0. Thus, for all y * ≤ σ∆, the ZLB binds for horizon h = 0, and
If instead y * ≥ σ∆, the ination target is achieved for horizon h = 0, and π 0 = y 0 = 0,
In this case, i.e., y * ≥ σ∆, since π 0 = y 0 = 0, the recursion reduces to
It is obvious that the ZLB necessarily binds for horizon h = 1, and
This implies that the ZLB binds even more tightly for horizon h = 2, and that y 2 , π 2 are even more negative. Hence, the ZLB binds even more tightly for horizon h = 3, and so on. One can show that the ZLB binds for all h ≥ 1, and thus the {y h , π h } for h ≥ 1 are given by the recursion 
where {y h , π h } are the sequences studied in Section B. Also, note that this solution is independent of the value of y * , as long as y * ≥ σ∆. 
Furthermore, for any values 0 ≤ y * ≤ σ∆, the recursive system of equations is linear with a boundary condition that is linear in y * . It follows that the solutions for each of the {y h , π h } must be linear functions of y * over the range of 0 ≤ y * ≤ σ∆. Thus, they must be convex combinations of the solutions for the cases y * = 0 and y * = σ∆, both of which have already been solved for. We then obtain the general solution One consequence is that, even though a debt nanced scal transfer to the private sector can reduce the size of output contraction and deation caused by the crisis, it does not follow that a large enough scal stimulus program can eliminate it altogether. The maximum eect of scal stimulus assuming that monetary policy continues to be the ination targeting regime is when y * = σ∆, and in that case, we still have y h = y h−1 < 0,
and π h = π h−1 < 0 for all h ≥ 1. Output and ination still fall, and indeed the predicted contraction and deation continue to be quite severe if h is large. Given the calibration in A conclusion is that, in order to completely eliminate the contracting and deating eects of the crisis shock, a transfer policy alone is insucient: it must be combined with an accomodative monetary policy that is, the central bank must promise to allow ination above the target rate π * , at least during the crisis period. Note that this is not true if the scal stimulus involves government purchases as studied in Section C, rather than debt-nanced transfers alone.
E Lump-sum Transfer Financed by Government Debt with Accomodative Monetary Regime
The limited eect of government transfer studied in Section D is due to the expectation that ination target would be pursued even during the crisis state, if consistent with the ZLB.
In this section, we consider a combination of scal and monetary policies, i.e., combining the government transfer with a commitment to maintain interest rate at the ZLB as long as the crisis state persists (instead of strict ination targeting during the crisis periods), and
show that the monetary-scal coordination has an eect larger than the sum of the eects of either policy individually.
Consider a scal policy similar to that in Section D but with an accomodative monetary policy. More specically, there is a debt-nanced scal lump-sum transfer and a permanent increase in the real public debt, parameterized by B * , the same as the specied scal policy Apart from the fact that it should be a more eective policy than that in Section D, an interesting feature of the coordinated policy is that a combination of a change in monetary policy and a change in scal policy can accomplish the goal that neither kind of policy can achieve on its own. On the one hand, simply changing monetary policy during the "crisis" Figure 7 indicates the government transfer needed to fully eliminate output contraction with respect to dierent planning horizons. Although the coordinated policy could achieve more desirable crisis response, the size of transfer needed is very large. For example, as shown in Figure 6 , when h = 40, i.e., 10 years, increasing public debt by 200 percent of GDP only raises output during crisis period by less than 1 percent. Another drawback is that the size of transfers needed to prevent output collapse if h is long will be so large as to be highly inationary if h is short.
Moreover, even if policymakers know the exact distribution of the planning horizons in economy, and can calibrate the size of transfer accordingly, if planning horizons are heterogeneous, then no choice of b * can avoid distortions induced by the fact that the same policy will be understood as much more expansionary by some households and rms than by others.
Other types of commitment to temporary departure from the ination target may be less prone to such diverse interpretations. Moreover, the fact that the eect is weaker in the case of households and rms with shorter horizons is consistent with producing similar responses of spending and price increases on the part of households and rms with heterogeneous horizons, a feature of a desirable stabilization policy as it reduces distortions resulting from diering interpretations of economic outlook.
F Temporary Price-level Targeting (TPLT)
In this section, we study the eects of a commitment to keep interest rate at the ZLB until price level is restored to trend path with constant ination rate π * , i.e., temporary price-level targeting rule. We focus on the case under which the decision makers in the economy do not update their value function, since it can be simply a commitment when a rare nancial shock occurs. It captures the idea of temporary price-level target suggested by Bernanke (2017).
Consider a policy in which the central bank denes a price level target path {P * t } that grows deterministically at rate π * , i.e., logP * t+1 = logP * t +π * t for all t, and achieves this target whenever it is consistent with the ZLB constraint, and setsî t as low as possible otherwise.
Its policy rule therefore requires thatP
at all times, where the price-level gap is dened asp t ≡ logP t − logP * t , and that either (B.1) or (F.1) must hold with equality in each period.
Evolution equation for the price-level gap is given bỹ
where π t is again the ination rate in excess of the target rate π * t .
The solution is also in the Markovian form: under this policy commitment, the structural equations looking forward from any date t depend only on the value ofp t−1 , which enters (F.2), and the current fundamental state r n t either in normal or crisis state. Thus, once the normal state is reached, the solution will be of the form
thereafter; while in the crisis state, the solution will be of the form
Our goal is to compute the functionsȳ 
and, for any horizon j ≥ 0, the price gapp j satises the property such that (i) ifp t−1 ≥p j , the price level target is expected to be reached before the end of the planning horizon (i.e., by period t + j or earlier), while (ii) ifp t−1 <p j , the ZLB is expected to bind over the entire planning horizon, i.e., through period t + j. 
By stating in this way, we see that the solution can be completely described by a pair of functionsȳ(p t−1 ),π(p t−1 ) and the function τ (p t−1 ), which encodes the values of the sequence {p j }.
Another description of the solution can be that there is a function F (p t−1 ) indicating whatp t is expected to be by any agent with a planning horizon h ≥ τ (p t−1 ), i.e., long enough that the price-level target is expected to be achieved within the planning horizon.
Whenp t−1 ≥p 0 , so that the price-level target is expected to be achieved in the current period, F (p t−1 ) = 0, and the functionsȳ(p t−1 ),π(p t−1 ) satisfȳ
The boundaries of the range over which this solution applies are the range of values ofp t−1 for which this solution satises the ZLB:ī(p t−1 ) ≥ −(r + π ) ⇒p t−1 ≥p 0 ≡ −κσ(r + π ).
Whenp t−1 ≤p 0 , the ZLB binds in period t, and the functionsȳ(p t−1 ), π(p t−1 ) and
The system (F.4a)-(F.4c) can be solved forȳ(p t−1 ),π(p t−1 ), F (p t−1 ) ifp t−1 is in a range such thatȳ(F (p t−1 )) andπ(F (p t−1 )) are already known as functions of F (p t−1 ). Hence, the solution forȳ(p t−1 ),π(p t−1 ) whenp 0 ≤p t−1 ≤ 0 allows us to obtain solutions forȳ(p t−1 ), 
Note that boundaries of this interval requires thatp 0 satises Here,p 2 satises
Similarly, for each progressively lower range of price gapsp 
Once we nd the function F (p t−1 ), thenπ(p t−1 ) = F (p t−1 ) −p t−1 ; this will also be a continuous, piece-wise linear function. Also, we havē
which is also a continuous, piece-wise linear function.
Now, suppose that we change the length of the time steps in our discrete-time model, making successive steps only a very short period of additional time. In the continuous limit, τ (p) becomes a continuously decreasing function. In this limiting case, we can equivalently describe any given price gapp using the implied length of time τ (p) until the price-level target is expected to be reached, by any agent with a horizon equal to τ (p) or longer. We can rewrite the functionsȳ(p),π(p) asȳ(τ ),π(τ ) instead.
In this continuous limit, the system (F.4a)-(F.4c) becomes
for all τ > 0. Note that ρ > 0 is the instantaneous nominal interest rate corresponding to the one-period nominal interest rate r + π , i.e., ρ ∆ = (r + π ), where ∆ is the length of a period in the discrete-time model, γ > 0 is the slope of the continuous time Philips curve relation corresponding to the slope κ in the discrete-time model, i.e., γ = κ ∆ 2 , and λ > 0 is the slope of the relationship between steady-state ination and steady-state output implied by the NK Phillips Curve, i.e., λ =
(1−β)∆ κ . The system (F.5a)-(F.5b) is solved from boundary conditionsπ(0) =ȳ(0) = 0.
The system (F.5a)-(F.5b) can be expressed in matrix form:
where the matrix has two real eigenvalues µ 1 < 0 < µ 2 , i.e., the roots of µ 2 + λγµ − σγ = 0.
The solution consistent with the boundary conditions is then given by
for all τ ≥ 0. We can then integrate the solution forπ(τ ) to obtain
for all τ > 0, so thatp(τ ) must be a monotonically decreasing continuous function. Hence, we can invert the functionp(τ ) to obtain
for anyp ≤ 0. Note that, though we cannot give an analytical expression for this function, it can be numerically computed by computing the functionp(τ ) given by (F.8).
The solution for dynamics in the normal state, in the continuous limit, are then given by: for any agent with a horizon h such thatp(t) ≥p(h), wherep(t) is the current existing price-level gap when decision is made andp(h) is dened in (F.8), the solution is
, where the functionsȳ(τ ),π(τ ) are dened in (F.7) and τ (p) is given by (F.9). 6 For any agent with a horizon h such thatp(t) ≤p(h), the solution isȳ
Thus, if the economy enters the normal state at time T , for an agent with a horizon h such thatp(T ) ≥p(h), the subsequent evolution will be expected to be:
If everyone has the same horizon h, the actual dynamics for t ≥ T will be exactly the same as expected. Even though the expected dynamics assumes that everyone's horizon shrinks as time goes forward, and this is not true for the actual dynamics (actually everyone's horizon continues to be h at all times), it continues to be true thatp(t) ≥p(h) for all t ≥ T since π(t) ≥ 0 impliesp(t) to be non-decreasing in t. Thus, the solution for the actual dynamics continues to be given by the same formulas as are assumed in people's forward planning.
For an agent with a horizon h such thatp(T ) ≤p(h), the subsequent evolution will instead be expected to be
But the actual dynamics, if everyone has the same horizon h andp(T ) ≤p(h), will be given by
as long as it continues to be the case thatp(t) ≤p(h). This latter inequality will hold as long as t ≤ T +
. Note that at this latter date,p(t) =p(h) ≤ 0, so the ZLB will still be binding, and the solution calculated above will still apply. But after that nite date, we will havep(t) ≥p(h), and the solution in the case ofp(T ) ≥p(h) will apply from then on. Thus, the actual dynamics will be given by
Now, consider the solution while still in the crisis state: instead of the dierential equations specied in the system (F.5a)-(F.5b) that apply in the normal state, we have
where ∆ > 0 is the instantaneous nominal rate corresponding to the one-period rate∆, i.e., ∆ =∆ ∆ where ∆ is the length of one period, and ν > 0 is the continuous arrival rate (Poisson rate) of transitions from the crisis state to the normal state, i.e., ν =
(1−δ) ∆ .
Let y(p, h), π(p, h) be the solution when the price-level gap isp and decision makers have planning horizon h. Then, in a forward planning exercise, we have dy dt = ∂y ∂p dp dt
so that the Euler equations give rise to a system of partial dierential equations, i.e.,
with boundary conditions y(p, 0) = π(p, 0) = 0. The functionsȳ(p, h),π(p, h) are the functions given byȳ dene a discrete grid of values for (p, h) and let (j, k) in the grid corresponding top =p(j · ) and h = k · for some > 0, where (j, k) are both non-negative integers.
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For each integer j ≥ 0, the goal is to compute sequences of values {y(j, k), π(j, k),p(j, k)} for progressively higher values of k. Consider the recursive computation, i.e., given the values for (y(j, k − 1), π(j, k − 1),p(j, k − 1)), we compute
The idea is that a sequence {y(j, k), π(j, k),p(j, k)} represents a possible trajectory (y(t), π(t),p(t)) along which the economy remains in the crisis state, though it is not known in advance that this will be the case. Along this trajectory, y(t) = y(p(t), h(t)), π(t) = π(p(t), h(t)) for all t, andp(t) and h(t) evolve according to dp(t) dt
The successive values of k index the remaining horizon h(t); the value of j indexes the particular trajectory, which is determined by the terminal values from which one initiates the recursive computation.
For any j ≥ 0, we start from terminal values y(j, 0) = π(j, 0) = 0 and some specied value forp(j, 0), then iteratively apply (F.11a)-(F.11c) to compute {y(j, k), π(j, k),p(j, k)} for progressively higher values of k. Thus, the complete trajectory depends on the value assumed forp(j, 0) ≤ 0.
In equations (F.11a)-(F.11c), the functionsȳ(
The measures how ne the grid is, and in the numerical calculation, we take = 0.2. The results are robust by using dierent values of .
We continue iterating the trajectories until either (i) the value k = K is reached, i.e, some pre-specied upper-bound on the range of values of k that are of interest, or (ii) one reaches a value of k at whichp(j, k) ≥ 0.
8 In the latter case, we stop iterating the trajectory at this point, and dene
as the largest value of k for trajectory j. Now, we characterize the terminal values {p(j, 0)} for the dierent values of j. The {p(j, 0)} is a monotonically decreasing sequence, i.e.,p(j + 1, 0) <p(j, 0) < 0 for all j ≥ 1. Furthermore, the sequence of values {p(j, 0)} that are considered is dense enough, i.e., successive values ofp(j, 0) should be close enough to one another, to ensure that for every value of k of interest (i.e., a value of k for which we intend to simulate the equilibrium dynamics), there exists some j such that k * (j) = k. In the numerical exercise, given the calibration in Section A.1, we nd there existing ap * < 0 such that, for any terminal values p * <p(j, 0) < 0, there always exists a k * (j) as dened before, but for any terminal values p(j, 0) <p * ,p(j, k) < 0 for ∀k ≥ 0, i.e.,p(j, k) becomes negatively exploding starting for some nite k. In other words, in the latter scenario, there does not exist a k * (j). Figure 8 illustrates the price trajectories with respect to planning horizons, and shows the decreasing sequence of terminal values on y-axis. Nonetheless, as long as we choose the the terminal values {p(j, 0)} to be smaller thanp * and make it dense enough, we will still be able to nd some j such that k * (j) = k for each k ≤ K.
Then, for each of the values of k of interest, we denê
Now, we characterize the predicted dynamics in response to a shock. Let the planning horizon k be given (one of the values of k of interest). Consider rst the dynamics for period t < N · = T , so that the economy remains in the crisis state. In any period t of the simulation, we can approximate the value ofp(t) by interpolation. We start the simulation in period t = 0, and setp(0) = 0. The price-level gap is approximated bỹ
In this numerical calculation, we take K = 300. 
Note that, since there exists a(k) such thatp((k), k) ≥ 0 has been computed, and there also exists at least one higher value of j for whichp(j, k) < 0 has also been computed, we can necessarily nd such a j t , and bothp(j t , k) andp(j t + 1, k) will have been computed unless we nd that there exist no j such thatp(t) <p(j t , k). The latter problem can be avoided by adding to the rst of trajectories j that are computed some additional trajectories starting from lower terminal values {p(j, 0)}.
We can then approximate the values of y(p(t), h), π(p(t), h) by linear interpolation, i.e., for all 0 ≤ t ≤ N − 1,
where the sequences of values {y(j, k), π(j, k)} for values j ≥(k) have been computed using (F.11a)-(F.11c). Under the temporary price-level targeting rule, Figure 9 , 10, and 11 show the full dynamics of price, output, and ination, respectively. In the numerical exercise, given the calibration in Section A.1, we assume that the economy enters crisis state at t = 0, and reverts to normal state at T = 10, i.e., 10 quarters after crisis happens.
To compare the results of the temporary price-level targeting with the strict ination targeting rule as in Section B, Figure 12 , 13, and 14 show the comparison of full dynamics for price, output, and ination, respectively. Though, under the temporary price-level targeting rule, there is an over-shooting for ination and output after reversion back to the normal state, it is much more eective in limiting the eects of the nancial crisis shock than the standard ination targeting policy. In this section, suppose that the price-level target is not simply an ad hoc commitment (form of forward guidance) introduced when the crisis shock occurs; instead, it is followed all the time, so that people obtain extensive experience with the dynamics under a price-level target during periods when the crisis shock never occurs. 
Starting from initial conditionp(T ) when the normal state is entered at t = T , and continuing until date t at whichp(t ) = 0.ȳ(τ ),π(τ ) are again given by equation (F.7) for all τ ≥ 0, and τ (p) is the function obtained by inverting the functionp(τ ) derived in (F.8). Note that this solution applies regardless of the planning horizon h, and not only when h ≥ τ (p(t)) as before; because if a agent has a horizon such that the price-level target is not expected to be reached within the planning horizon, the value function used to evaluate the terminal state is correct, i.e., the same valuation as would be calculated by an agent with a longer planning horizon, which is long enough to see forward to a date at which the price-level target is achieved.
Thus, if the economy enters the normal state at date T , regardless of the horizon h, the subsequent evolution is and is expected to be
Here, there are no longer two phases of the solution for the evolution after date T , i.e., no longer depending on whetherp(t) is greater or less thanp(h); instead, there is only one phase. The solution for the dynamics of y(t), π(t),p(t) can be computed in closed form using equations (F.7) and (F.8), once one has determined the value of τ (p(T )).
Now, consider the dynamics in the crisis state : under the assumption that the value function, which is learned and also used in the crisis state, is the one that is correct in the normal state (the only state in which people have had prior experiences from which to learn the value function). Then, the trajectory that is anticipated by a nite-horizon planner in the crisis state is given by paths {y(t), π(t),p(t), h(t)}, where h(t) is the remaining planning horizon at each point in time t, starting from the time at which the planning takes place. The paths {y(t), π(t),p(t), h(t)} satisfy a system of dierential equations:
whereȳ(t) is the value if there is reversion to the normal sate at time t. The system of (G.1a)-(G.1d) is from time t = t 0 (the time at which the planning exercise is undertaken) until t = t 0 + h 0 (the actual planning horizon of the agent), starting from initial conditionsp(t 0 ) (given by actual dynamics up to time t 0 ) and h(t 0 ) = h 0 (the agent's actual planning horizon when the planning exercise is undertaken), and also satisfy terminal conditions y(t 0 + h 0 ) =ȳ(τ (p(t 0 + h 0 ))), π(t 0 + h 0 ) =π(τ (p(t 0 + h 0 ))) (G.2) Here, the terminal conditions (G.2) reect the fact that the value functions v(p) and v(p) that are used when the planning process is terminated at time t 0 + h 0 are the ones that would be correct under the dynamics in the normal state. That is, these are beliefs that would be correct if it were expected that, at time t 0 + h 0 , the economy will necessarily revert to the normal state if it has not already done so previously. Hence, the terminal beliefs are the same as the beliefs that would be jumped to in the event of a Poisson transition to the normal state.
Similar to Section F.2, an anticipated trajectory in the crisis state also has to satisfy equations (G.1a)-(G.1d), but instead of terminal conditions (G.2), we impose the terminal conditions y(t 0 + h 0 ) = 0, π(t 0 + h 0 ) = 0 regardless of the value ofp(t 0 + h 0 ). In addition to the dierent terminal conditions, the method used in Section F.2 has a more complex specication ofȳ(p(t), h(t)); in contrast, equations (G.1a)-(G.1b) under systematic price-level targeting apply only in the case of h(t) ≥ τ (p(t)) ⇔p(t) ≥p(h(t)) as in Section F.2.
We then numerically solve the system using the same method as in Section F.2. Each trajectory j is associated with a particular possible value τ (p(t 0 + h 0 )) = τ j > 0. We assume that the {τ j } are a monotonically increasing sequence. For remaining horizon k = 0, from (G.2), we then have y(j, 0) =ȳ(τ j ), π(j, 0) =π(τ j ),p(j, 0) =p(τ j )
Starting from these initial values, we then use equations (F.11a)-(F.11c) to recursively calculate y(j, k), π(j, k),p(j, k) for progressively higher values of k. The process is continued for values of k up to k = K, i.e., the longest horizon of interest for purposes of the simulations, or until one reaches a value of k at whichp(j, k) ≥ 0.
Given a numerical solution for a set of trajectories indexed by j, we can compute respectively. In the numerical exercise, as in Section F.2, the economy enters crisis state at t = 0, and reverts to normal state at T = 10.
To compare the results of temporary price-level targeting rule with systematic pricelevel targeting rule, Figure 18 , 19, and 20 show the comparison of full dynamics for price, output, and ination under these two policies, respectively. If the planning horizon is large, e.g., more than ve years, i.e., h ≥ 20, there is not much dierence between the two pricelevel targeting rules. But, if the planning horizon is short for some portion of the people, the systematic price-level targeting rule would improve output and ination during crisis much better. Thus, following a systematic price-level targeting rule, even when nancial frictions are unimportant, can be more eective in limiting the eects of the nancial crisis shock than a temporary price-level targeting rule introduced only when crisis occurs, Some might suppose that recognizing limitations on people's ability to correctly anticipate future consequences of a new policy should reduce the benets from policy commitment, and hence favor a purely discretionary approach to policy. In our analysis, instead, recogniz- ing that planning horizon may not be too long reduces the predicted ecacy of temporary commitments in response to a special situation, and strengthens the case of seeking to design regimes that apply all the time.
